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THE OBSTACLES TO SUPPRESSING RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORIST
FINANCING
John D. G. Waszak*
I. Introduction - Terrorism Pays: Small Money, Big Bang
The September 11 attacks cost al-Qaeda a relatively modest sum. The
Federal Bureau of Investigations estimates that al-Qaeda spent $175,000 to
$500,000 on the attacks and lost nineteen operatives.' The damage to the
United States was estimated to be in excess of $135 billion and over 3,000
dead.2 The cost of making a suicide bomb can be as low as five dollars,
while deployment of a suicide bomber, including transportation and
reconnaissance, can cost as little as $200. 3 A suicide bomber is an asset
that can be traded for weapons or cash, or who can, for a relatively low
cost, be deployed with "successful" results.4 Terrorist organizations often
get enormous returns on their modest operational investments.
In addition to the funds needed to conduct actual attacks, organizations
like al-Qaeda need funds for support infrastructure, such as training camps,
traveling expenses, payment of operatives, weapons, technology, and
housing. Al-Qaeda's start up costs for establishing a base of operations in
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1 According to testimony of FBI Director Robert Mueller and FBI reports, the attacks cost
between $175,000 and $250,000. HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE AND
THE SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001, S. REP. No. 107-351 & H.R. REP No. 107-792, at 147-148
(2002) (hereinafter 9/11 Joint Congressional Inquiry Report). FBI Supervisory Special
Agent Steven Garfinkel revealed that the total disbursements of money ($303,671.62) from
the hijackers bank accounts in Florida exceeded the total deposit amount ($303,481.63). Mr.
Garfinkel added that the hijackers also used substantial amounts of loose cash, and estimated
the total cost of the attacks to be as much as $500,000. Paul Beckett, September 11, Attacks
Cost $303,672; Plot Papers Lacking, FBI Says, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2002, at B4.
2 LORETTA NAPOLEONI, MODERN JIHAD: TRACING THE DOLLARS BEHIND THE TERROR
NETWORKS 179 (2003).
3 1d. at 178-79.
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Afghanistan was estimated to be around $50 million.5 Before the United
States attack on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda's estimated annual
expenditures, the money necessary to maintain a core strength of 3,000
members in Afghanistan and its international operatives, was estimated at
$36 million, with a total annual budget estimated to be around $50 million.6
After the September 11 attacks, stopping terrorism became a
paramount concern to both Americans and the international community.
Terrorist organizations require money and money transfer methods to
support their organizations and conduct attacks. Accordingly, it makes
sense to focus on terrorist financing and to strengthen laws designed to
detect and stop terrorist financing. However, the international money
laundering and terrorist financing laws and standards mandated by various
United Nations Security Council Resolutions and recommended by various
international organizations like the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),7
are ineffective due to a complex intersection of various religious, cultural,
economic and political factors and institutions present in many relevant
States.
A. The Difference between Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing: Greed v. Revolution
Radical Islamic terrorist financing differs dramatically from the money
laundering of illegal profits seen in criminal enterprises-most notably
narcotics trafficking and "narco-terrorism." The Department of Defense
defines narco-terrorism as violence conducted to further the aims of drug
traffickers. 8  But there is no universal definition of "terrorism." 9  The
5 ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL-QAEDA 81-82 (2002) (explaining that the estimates are
based on a comparison of "budgets of terrorist groups in relation to their sources of finance,
geographic distribution, organizational sophistication, size and other factors"). But see, Dirk
Laabs, A Dwarf Known as al Qaeda; The Threat Posed the Group is Hugely Overblown,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at B13 (according to French terrorism investigator, Judge Jean-
Louis Bruguiere, "al-Qaeda never had a 'macro-financing' structure ... and there were
never larger flows of external money financing any attack").
6 GUNARATNA, supra note 5, at 81-82.
7 The Financial Action Task Force was created in 1989 as a multilateral initiative to
develop policies to help States combat money laundering. In 2001, it expanded its scope to
combat terrorist financing. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, More about the FATF and its
Work, at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/AboutFATFen.htm.
8 JOINT DOCTRINE BRANCH, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND
ASSOCIATED TERMS, at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/je/doddict/data/n/03533.html.
9 See Boaz Ganor, Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man 's Freedom
Fighter?, INT'L POLICY INST. FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, available at
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/define.htm. (discussing the differences between national
liberators, revolutionaries, anarchists, etc., and proposing that terrorism be defined as "the
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motivation for terrorism is predominantly political, while the motivation for
narco-terrorism and other criminal enterprises is predominantly economic.' 0
Unlike criminal enterprises that derive income from criminal activities,
radical Islamic terrorist organizations often work from largely legitimate
funds including charity donations and business profits.
Terrorist financing and money laundering share key features, yet also
differ in several aspects. Narcotics traffickers work from illegal profits
("dirty money"). The first phase of money laundering is placement, which
involves the physical placement of the dirty money, usually in the form of
cash, into the formal financial system." This is often achieved by breaking
up large sums of cash into smaller sums ("smurfing" or "structuring") or
converting the cash into less suspicious instruments like money orders, and
then depositing the small sums or monetary instruments into separate bank
branches.'2 In the second phase of money laundering, layering, the dirty
money is transferred from its original source through a series of
transactions, often including the purchasing of investment instruments and
the wire transfer of funds to accounts in States that have strict bank secrecy
laws. 13 In the third phase, integration, the now laundered money re-enters
the legitimate economy, and is used to purchase luxury goods, real estate,
or businesses. 14
The key difference between the money laundering of criminal profits
and terrorist financing is simple: money laundering cleans dirty money;
terrorist financing dirties clean money. By using convoluted transactions in
the layering stage, terrorist financing conceals the source of the funds,
which ensures that such sources remain fertile. However, the dirty work of
terrorist financing, the terrorist act, is at the integration stage, which is the
exact opposite outcome of money laundering. 15
Purely criminal organizations, such as the Colombian Medillin Cartel,
can conduct terrorist attacks and political negotiations that resemble the
intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in
order to attain political aims").
10 U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, 2003 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT,
Volume I: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes 8 (2004) (prepared annually every
March 1 for Congress, in accordance with §489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961).
11 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, Basic Facts about Money Laundering, available at
http://www 1.oecd.org/fatf/MLaunderingen.htm#How%20is%20money%201aundered?
(2004).
12 id.
13 id
14 1d
15 Hawala and Underground Terrorist Financing Mechanisms: Before the Subcomm. on
Int'l Trade and Fin. of the Comm. On Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107
Cong. 49 (2002) (statement of Mr. Patrick Yost, Product Development Manager, SRA
International, Inc., formerly of FinCEN).
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methods and aims of a true terrorist organization. However, these criminal
organizations are focused on securing profits through illegal enterprise, and
are not as capable of gathering popular donations the way the Irish
Republican Army did in the 1970's and 1980's or HAMAS does today.
16
Additionally, some radical Islamic organizations have also participated in
drug trafficking, and by transferring these illicit profits to an organization-
controlled front company or donating to a controlled front charity
organization, these funds can be effectively laundered. Groups like al-
Qaeda, however, benefit from a network of charities, mosques, banks and
other financial institutions that have served Islamic causes since the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan.'
7
Operationally, money laundering and terrorist financing use many of
the same techniques to move funds. 18 However, the size of the transactions
often differ because money launderers must place large quantities of illegal
cash into a financial system without detection, while a terrorist financier
needs to move a smaller amount of funds to a terrorist cell.19 To move their
funds, drug traffickers and terrorist groups can readily identify those States
that have weak money laundering and terrorist financing laws and
regulations. To raise funds, terrorist groups conduct their activities in
States where there are affluent and sympathetic communities, such as the
United States, and where their fundraising activities are either legal or
easily concealed. On this latter point, this includes those nations that do not
consider a group like HAMAS to be a terrorist organization, which includes
nearly all nations of the Middle East, and until September 6, 2003, the
European Union.2° Until recently, in many nations key to stopping terrorist
financing, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, money
laundering of drug profits was illegal while terrorist financing was not.2 1
16 RENSSELAER LEE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICES, TERRORIST FINANCING: THE
U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 6 (2002).
17 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TERRORIST FINANCING: REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT
TASK FORCE SPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 7 (2002) (hereinafter CFR
Report on Terrorist Financing 2002).
18 U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, 2002 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT,
Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, at 7 (2003) (asserting that criminal organizations
and terrorists both employ the services of the same types of money professionals, including
currency exchangers, bankers, accountants and lawyers, to assist in the transfer of their
funds) (hereinafter INCSR 2002).
19 d. at6.
20 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UPDATE ON THE GLOBAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST
TERRORIST FINANCING: SECOND REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE SPONSORED BY THE
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 12 (2004) (hereinafter CFR Update on Terrorist Financing
2004).
21 INCSR 2002, supra note 18, at 79-80.
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B. Formal Financial Institutions and Informal Funds Transfer
Systems: Two Potential Conduits for Terrorist Financing
In States all over the world, both formal financial institutions22 and
informal funds transfer systems23 permit transactions under relative degrees
of secrecy. To detect illegal transactions in formal financial institutions,
some States mandate reporting requirements on suspicious transactions or
transfers over a designated amount. Many States do not have the financial
intelligence infrastructure necessary to detect illegal transactions. In other
situations, the cost of regulating and enforcing laws are prohibitive.
Businesses and individuals from all over the world are attracted to States
with bank secrecy laws,24 such as the Cayman Islands, where the selling of
financial services represents an estimated thirty percent of the gross
domestic product.
25
Informal funds transfer systems are difficult to detect because of their
underground nature. The hawala is an often informal network based on
trust that is particular to various South Asian ethnicities and found
wherever these groups relocate, including the United States and the United
Arab Emirates ("U.A.E."). 26 Informal networks vary in operational method
22 For this Note, formal financial institutions generally include those institutions that are
regulated by a government, such as banks and other traditional institutions.
23 "Informal funds transfers systems" are also commonly described as "alternative
remittance systems," "informal value transfer systems," or "underground banking." Specific
types of informal funds transfers systems include the "hawala," "hundi," "fei-ch'ien" and
others. The general term "informal funds transfer systems" will be used in this Note, and the
type focused on will be the "hawala." See generally, Mohammed El Qorchi et al., INFORMAL
FuNDs TRANSFER SYSTEMS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMAL HAWALA SYSTEM,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Occasional Paper 222, 1-2, 6 (2003).
24 Bank secrecy laws prohibit a bank from revealing the existence of an account and
disclosing information about the account without the consent of the customer.
25 Natasha Lance Rogoff, Haven or Havoc, P.B.S. Frontline website, available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/schemes/cayman.html.
26 Hawala and Underground Terrorist Financing Mechanisms: Before the Subcomm. on
Int'l Trade and Fin. of the Comm. On Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107
Cong. 43 (2001) (prepared statement of Rahim Bariek, Bariek Money Transfer). Mr. Bariek,
a U.S. based hawala operator ("hawaladar") based in Northern Virginia, describes his
licensed business:
One of my customers comes to me with $300 and asks to send it to his brother in Pakistan. Charging
about a 5 percent commission, I take the money and give my customer a transfer/code number which
they give to their family in Pakistan. They will need that transfer/code number and identification to get
the money from InsafExchange. The family member in Pakistan must also sign a form to show that they
received the money. I call and fax Insaf Exchange with the name of the person who will get the money
and the transfer/code number. Within 24 hours, the money is guaranteed safe in the hands of my
customer's family in Pakistan.
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and often fail to leave a paper trail. Al-Qaeda allegedly used such methods,
including hawala transfers, to implement the September 1 1I attacks.27
Because these networks are often used for legitimate reasons,28 the current
approach to stopping their usage in terrorist financing appears to be
formalization through governmental regulation or criminalization.
C. The Roadmap for this Note
Part II of this paper will provide an outline of the legal framework
designed to stop and suppress terrorist financing, starting with the
international response that establishes the legal norms and obligations of
States. The laws of the United States, including the anti-terrorist financing
provisions of the Patriot Act, will be examined as an example of a
reasonably effective regulatory and law enforcement regime. Additionally,
Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. are crucial to the analysis of radical Islamic
terrorist financing. Saudi Arabia has been regarded as an "epicenter" of
terrorist financing by the General Counsel of the Department of the
29 wilbTreasury, and will be examined in relation to fundraising via charities.
According to the Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001, the "banking and wire service infrastructure" of the
U.A.E. aided the September 11 hijackers. Four transfers totaling
approximately $110,000 to a SunTrust account in Venice, Florida, served as
the principal funding for the attacks. 30  Due to such transfers, and the
reputation of the U.A.E. as a financial center of the Persian Gulf with lax
banking regulations and unregulated free trade zones, the U.A.E. serves as a
particularly illustrative example of the problems of money laundering and
terrorist financing mechanisms in the Middle East.3'
Part III will examine how radical Islamic terrorist organizations
actually finance their operations. Additionally, it will be necessary to
27 INCSR 2003, supra note 10, at 22; but see, Samuel Munzele Maimbo & Nikos Passas,
The Regulation and Supervision of Informal Remittance Systems, 15 SMALL ENTERPRISE
DEV. 53, at 59, (2004) ("It is worth noting that despite some claims made in the press about
methods used by the September 11 hijackers to transfer funds, all available evidence points
top their use of banks, wire services, credit card accounts and other regulated remitters").
28 One legitimate usage of informal funds transfer systems is when an immigrant worker
sends money to his family that lives in a nation that lacks reliable formal financial
institutions.
29 David Aufhauser, General Counsel, Dep't of the Treasury, Written testimony before the
Comm. on Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Sept. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/j s760.htm.
30 9/11 Joint Congressional Inquiry Report, supra note 1, at 147-148.
31 See Glenn R. Simpson, U.A.E. Banks Had Suspect Transfers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17,
2003, at Al0; Timothy L. O'Brien, Terror Fund Focus is on Dubai: Ancient Ways Make
Money Hard to Track, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 6, 2003, at 1.
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describe certain cultural, political, and economic conditions that complicate
the battle against terrorism in general, and terrorist financing in particular.
Furthermore, the context provided will demonstrate why the laws set up
both internationally and nationally are substantially ineffective.
I. The Legal Framework Designed to Suppress Terrorist Financing
A. The International Response to the Attacks of September 1 1 th
1. The United Nations Security Council Resolutions
On September 28, 2001, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 1373, which specifically requires that States shall:
[1] [p]revent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
[2] [c]riminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly
or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the
intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are
to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts;
[3] [flreeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic
resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or
participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons
and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and
entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons
and entities; and
[4] [p]rohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their
territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources
or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for
the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or
participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and
entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons.32
Security Council Resolutions are considered binding on member
States, but the extent of the legal obligation depends on the language used
32 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th Mtg., at l(a)-(d), U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (2001).
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in the Resolution.33 The verb "shall" used in the first paragraph of the
resolution, which includes the four requirements discussed above, imposes
a legal obligation on States.34 Resolution 1373 also obligates all States to
submit reports detailing measures taken to comply with the order to
suppress and prevent terrorist financing, which the Security Council's
Counter-Terrorism Committee reviews to identify problems.35
Other relevant Security Council Resolutions include action against
specific parties. Resolution 139036 was adopted on January 16, 2002, and
serves as a continuation of Resolutions 126737 and 1333,38 which called for
the freezing of assets owned or controlled by Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda,
and the Taliban. Essentially, these resolutions require nations to "freeze
without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources"
of those entities and individuals designated by the U.N.3 9
2. The International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism (1999)
In 1999, the United Nations adopted the International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism ("Convention").40 The
Convention obligates party States to: (1) create domestic laws that
criminalize the financing of terrorist acts;41 (2) provide legal and law
enforcement to other party States;42 and (3) require financial institutions to
implement reporting and diligence requirements.43
Criminal legislation written to comply with the Convention would
have to include the mental element of (1) willfulness of the act and (2)
either the intention or knowledge that the funds would go towards a terrorist
act.44 "Financing" is defined broadly as the provision or collection of funds
33 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, LEGAL DEPARTMENT, SUPPRESSING THE FINANCING
OF TERRORISM: A HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 16 (2003) (hereinafter IMF
Terrorist Financing Legislative Handbook).
34 id.
31 S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 32, at 6.
36 S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4452nd Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (2002)
37 S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4051st Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999).
38 S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4251st Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (2000).
" S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 36, at 2(a).
40 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res.
54/109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 76th mtg., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/Res/53/108 (1999).
41 Id. at art. 4.
421 Id. at art. 18.
43 id.
44 IMF Terrorist Financing Legislative Handbook, supra note 33, at 7.
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"by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully. '
"Terrorist act" is defined as any act that (1) causes death or serious injury to
a civilian that is (2) meant to compel a government to do or not do
something.46
The Convention has been signed by 132 States, and ratified by 112
States.47 Absent from the list of States that have ratified the Convention are
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
3. The Financial Action Task Force: Special Recommendations on
Terrorist Financing (2001)
In 1989, the G7 founded the multi-governmental agency of the
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering ("FATF") with the
purpose of documenting cases of money laundering and developing
strategies to counter laundering, and convincing States to adopt measures to
detect and prosecute laundering.48 FATF is made up of 29 States (U.A.E.
and Saudi Arabia are not members) and after the September 116h attacks, it
focused on money laundering as it relates to terrorist financing.49
FATF developed the eight Special Recommendations, 50 which have
become the international standard for evaluating a state's anti-terrorist
financing laws. Additionally, an ad-hoc Group on Non-Cooperative
Countries and Territories ("NCCT") was created to evaluate and apply
pressure on those States that undermine the money laundering efforts of the
FATF. States end up on the list of NCCT by having financial regulation
loopholes, regulatory requirements obstacles, obstacles to international
cooperation, and failing to provide adequate resources for preventing and
detecting money laundering activities.5
The Special Recommendations overlap with both the Convention and
Security Council Resolutions. For example, Recommendation I asks States
45 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra note
40 at art. 2, 1.
46 Id.; IMF Terrorist Financing Legislative Handbook, supra note 33, at 7.
47 UNITED NATIONS website, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General,
The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, available
at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/Status/Chapter-xviii/treaty 1.asp.
48 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, More about the FA TF and its Work, at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/AboutFATFen.htm.
49 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, Members and Observers, at http://wwwl.oecd.org/
fatf/Members en.htm.
50 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING
(2001).
51 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REPORT ON NON-
COOPERATIVE COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, 11-13 (2000).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
to ratify and implement the 1999 United Nations International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The United States
enacted the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention
Implementation Act of 2002 to comply with this recommendation.52 Many
key nations are party to the convention, but have yet to ratify and
implement it, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Columbia.53 Other key
nations have not yet sined the convention, including the United Arab
Emirates and Pakistan. Recommendation III addresses terrorist asset
freezing, and requires jurisdictions to implement measures that will freeze
and seize terrorist-related funds and assets in accordance with Security
Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373.55
In response to the usage by radical Islamic terrorist organizations of
the financing mechanisms briefly introduced in Part I, FATF has made
three pertinent recommendations regarding charity organizations, wire
transfers, and informal funds transfer systems ("alternative remittance
systems").
Certain terrorist groups use charity organizations to both collect and to
transfer funds. Recommendation VIII urges nations to take measures to
ensure that non-profit organizations are not abused for the purposes of
terrorist financing. The FATF calls for States to impose verification,
oversight, and financial transparency requirements on charities as well as
sanctions against those charities that support terrorism.
56
The September 1l th hijackers received various international wire
transfers that originated in the United Arab Emirates. With
Recommendation VII, the FATF aspires to ensure that basic information on
both the beginning and end users of wire transfers are immediately
available to law enforcement, financial intelligence units, and target
financial institutions.57
Additionally, terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda have allegedly used
informal networks to move funds. Recommendation VI asks States to
regulate informal funds transfer systems such as the hawala through
licensing, registering, and the imposition of civil and criminal sanctions on
those that do not comply. The goal of the FATF is to bring these methods
52 Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, The International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra note 47.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERPRETATIVE NOTE TO SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION
III: FREEZING AND CONFISCATING TERRORIST ASSETS (2003).
56 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, COMBATING THE ABUSE OF NON-PROFIT
ORGANISATIONS: INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES, 4-8 (2002).
57 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERPRETATIVE NOTE TO SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION
VII: WIRE TRANSFERS (2003).
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into the mainstream of financial regulatory norms, and to apply money
laundering and terrorist financing laws to these systems outside the
mainstream financial sector.58
B. The Domestic Laws of Key States: The United States, Saudi
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
1. The United States Counterterrorist Financing Regime
According to the Department of Justice, new counterterrorist financing
laws allow for four initiatives: the (1) criminalization of terrorist financing;
the (2) enforcement of terrorist crimes on known terrorist organizations and
their supporters; the (3) identification of other terrorists and supporters of
terrorist organizations through financial analysis; and the (4) freezing and
confiscation of assets of identified terrorist organizations and their
supporters.5 9 Underlying these initiatives is the concept of "list making,"
that is, the designation and publication by the Executive branch of
individuals and organizations that have been determined to be terrorists.6°
No one is allowed to conduct or facilitate a financial transaction with those
who appear on the list.
The major weapon in the arsenal of the counterterrorist financing
regime is the criminalization of material support for terrorist
61organizations. Such a law can be used against a variety of actors,including individuals engaged in cigarette smuggling, banks that knowingly
transfer funds to designated terrorists, or charity organizations that collect
funds for terrorist organizations, as well as the donor. Because charity
organizations work from otherwise legitimate sources of money, the
criminalization of providing material support is, in essence, the major
criminal counterterrorist financing provision of the United States Criminal
Code. This provision, combined with the anti-money laundering laws
discussed below, provide effective tools for prosecutors bringing charges
against a terrorist financier.
58 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERPRETATIVE NOTE TO SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION
VI: ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE (2003).
59 U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, United States Attorney's Bulletin: Terrorist Financing Issues 8
(Jul. 2003).
60 See Generally Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War on the Financing of
Terrorism and Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global
Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1341, 1355-73 (2004).
61 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-2339B (2001).
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a. A Brief History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws
The Patriot Act62 adds additional burdens on banks and brokerages to
report suspicious activities and to compile data on customers, 63 as well as
expand forfeiture laws,64 restrict the ability of shell banks to do business in
the United States,65 and encourage information exchange between the
government and private banks.6 6 The private banking industry serves as a
front line of investigation regarding terrorist financing.
The Patriot Act amplifies and extends pre-existing anti-money
laundering laws. Money laundering is a crime in America, and its status as
a crime has undergone two evolutions. First, the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970
("BSA") required financial institutions to file Currency Transaction Reports
("CTR") whenever an individual deposited over $10,000 in a single day or
transferred funds in excess of $10,000 within or outside the United States.
67
The BSA of 1970 was largely a law enforcement device for criminal, tax,
and regulatory investigations, and actual money laundering was not a crime.
Additionally, banks did not comply with the BSA on a regular basis by
banks.68
In 1984, Congress criminalized money laundering by passing 18
U.S.C. §1956 ("Laundering of monetary instruments") and 18 U.S.C.
§1957 ("Engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from
specified unlawful activity").69 The 1986 Money Laundering Control Act
made structuring of transactions to avoid Currency Transaction Reports a
crime. The criminalization of money laundering was largely in response to
the massive amounts of money exchanging hands and sifting through
American financial institutions as a product of the illegal trade of narcotics.
Clearly, with the Patriot Act's amplified reporting and due diligence
requirements, Congress has intended to provide a means to conduct
additional financial analysis as part of a counterterrorist financing regime.
62 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Acts of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 of the United States
Code) (2001) (hereinafter Patriot Act) (2001).
63 Patriot Act, supra note 62, at §312 and §326.
64Id. at §319 and §372.
65 Id. at §313.
66Id. at §314.
67 Scott Sulzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to Combat It,
63 TENN. L. REv. 143, at 153 (1995).
61 Id. at 154.
69 Id. at 159-60.
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b. Expanding the Definition of Financial Institutions:
Regulating the Hawala
The Patriot Act expands the class of financial institutions in America
that have are required to file Currency Transaction Reports ("CTR") and
Suspicious Activity Reports ("SAR") and otherwise comply with the Bank
Secrecy Act, to include securities brokers-dealers,7 ° commodity traders,71
and non-financial trades and businesses transacting in excess of $10,000.72
The Patriot Act also requires every financial institution, including banks,
savings associations, and credit unions; securities brokers; futures
commission merchants and introducing brokers; casinos; money services
businesses; mutual funds; and credit card system operators, to establish an
internal anti-money laundering program.
Non-bank money transmitters, (informal funds transfer systems) are
considered Money Service Businesses ("MSBs"), which include check
cashers, currency exchangers, and issuers, sellers, and redeemers of
traveler's checks, money orders, and stored value.74 The definition of
"money transmitter" was formerly limited to those individuals who engaged
"as a business" in the acceptance or transmission of funds through the
formal financial institutions sector, such as through a bank.75
The definition of the MSB was updated to include those informal
funds transfer systems that did not operate in a formal business setting or
operated outside the formal financial institutions sector; such informal
funds transfer systems are now responsible for complying with the Bank
Secrecy Act.76 The informal hawala now fits into the regulatory definition
of a money transmitter and treated, for purposes of the Bank Secrecy Act,
as a Money Service Business.
As of 2002, the principals of all MSBs were required to register with
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, as well as submit a list of agents and
subagents.77 The MSBs are now required to comply with all provisions of
70 Patriot Act, supra note 62, at §356(a).
71 Id., at §356(b).
Id. at §365.
Sld. at §352.
74 U.S. DEP'T. OF TREASURY, A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION
359 OF THE UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS
REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001 8 (2002) (hereinafter
Treasury Dep't Report on Section 359)
" 31 C.F.R. §103.11(uu)(5) (2002).
76 Patriot Act, supra note 62, at §359; see Treasury Dep't Report on Section 359, supra
note 74, at 8.
77 31 C.F.R. § 103.41 (2002).
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the Bank Secrecy Act, including due diligence and verification of customer
identities and target beneficiaries for transfers over $3,000.78 Additionally,
MSBs must report all transactions over $750 when subject to a Geographic
Targeting Order, which, under the BSA, imposes stricter reporting and
recordkeeping requirements on specified financial service providers in a
certain geographical area for a limited time period, for law enforcement and
intelligence operations.79
MSBs that fail to register properly with FinCEN are subject to
penalties of $5,000 a day until registration is completed, and may also be
imprisoned for five years. Additionally, failure to operate an MSB in
compliance with Treasury Department regulations of reporting and record
keeping can result in civil and criminal penalties.8°
These regulatory and legal instruments requiring due diligence, record
keeping, and reporting by formal financial institutions and informal funds
transfer systems are designed to detect two crimes relevant to terrorist
financing. First, money laundering is a crime under Section 1956 and 1957
of the U.S. Criminal Code.81  Money laundering involves financial
monetary transactions with criminal profits. Under Section 1956, a
defendant must act with the intent to: (1) promote the carrying on of a
specified unlawful activity; (2) engage in tax fraud; (3) conceal or disguise
the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the property; or (4)82
avoid a transaction-reporting requirement. Section 1957 encompasses the
same elements, but the defendant need not have knowledge of a specific
unlawful activity, only know that the money being transacted had general
criminal origins.8 3
Second, Sections 2339A and 2339B of the U.S. Criminal Code
criminalize the provision of material support to a terrorist or to a designated
terrorist organization.84 To be prosecutable, a defendant would have to
knowingly provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
organization, or attempt or conspire to do so.
8 5
The key difference between money laundering and providing material
support involves the source and destination of the transaction: the source of
the money in a money laundering case is often criminal and the destination
for the material support to a terrorist organization is what renders the
transaction criminal. However, a terrorist financier can easily launder
78 Id. at §103.33(f).
79 Id. at §5326(d).
80 18 U.S.C. §1960 (2004).
" Id. at §§ 1956-57.
82 Treasury Dep't Report on Section 359, supra note 74, at 9.
83 id.
'4 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-2339B (2002)
85 Id. at §2339B(a)(1).
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criminal funds in providing material support to a terrorist organization.
Additionally, a person who structures bank deposits of legally obtained
funds to avoid reporting requirements is guilty of money laundering, and if
he or she provides these funds to a designated terrorist organization, he is
also guilty of providing material support.
c. Equipping the Raider: Regulation of Charity
Organizations
At a fundraiser in Cleveland, Ohio during the fall of 1991, Imam
Fawaz Damra passionately pleaded with his audience to donate money for
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, an organization that has since been designated as
a Foreign Terrorist Organization: "whoever equipped a raider for the sake
of God, he himself has raided .. .The one who supports a raider gains
honorarium.'
86
In response to this phenomenon, actors in the United States that abuse
charities for the purposes of terrorist financing are prosecutable for
providing material support to terrorists. 8 7  Charity organizations in the
United States are not subject to exclusive regulation, and the only federal
oversight comes from the Internal Revenue Service, which examines the
activities of organizations to determine whether or not they deserve tax-
exempt status in accordance with tax law.88  Additionally, most States
require charities to register locally, in accordance with the Model Act
Concerning the Solicitation of Funds for Charitable Purposes, which
ensures that consumers are protected from fraudulent charities.8 9 Another
important level of regulation is within the private sector, and includes the
Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance and Guidestar. 90
Presidential Executive Order 13224, under the legislative authority
discussed below, allows for the designation of global charity organizations
86 John Caniglia, Damra is Classic Islamic Militant, Witness says, CLEv. PLAIN DEALER,
May 28, 2004 at Al.
87 18 U.S.C §§ 2339A-2339B (2002) ("the term "material support or resources" means
currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging,
training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious
materials").
88 
LETTER DATED 14 JUNE 2002 FROM THE CHARGt D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE UNITED STATES
MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1373 (2001) CONCERNING COUNTER-
TERRORISM, at 9, U.N. Doc. S/2002/674 (2002).
89 id.
901d. at 16.
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as terrorist organizations, which permits the freezing of their assets and
prohibits U.S. persons from conducting business with them.
d. Reaching for the Faucet: Entities that are prohibited
from Accessing the U.S. Financial System
Four legislative acts grant the Executive the authority to publicly
designate individuals and entities as terrorist organizations, which permits
the blocking of their assets and funds and prohibits U.S. persons from
conducting business with the designated individuals. 91  Two lists of
designations authorized by these legislative acts are particularly
instrumental: (1) a "Foreign Terrorist Organization" ("FTO") is an
organization designated to be a foreign terrorist organization by executive
order or by notification by the Secretary of State to Congress of the
intention to designate the organization as a foreign terrorist organization
under the 8 U.S.C. §1189(a) of the AEDPA; and (2) a "Specially
Designated Global Terrorist" ("SDGT") is either a foreign or domestic
individual or organization designated to be a SDGT by the Secretary of the
Treasury, or by the Secretary of State but without notification to Congress
under 50 U.S.C. §1701 of the IEEPA and Executive Order 13224.
Individuals can administratively and legally challenge their designations.
Another effective tool, "special measures," as authorized by Section
311 of the Patriot Act, grants power to the Executive to restrict access to the
United States financial system of whole States and foreign banks and their
subsidiaries that lack effective terrorist financing countermeasures.92 The
United States has a five tier response to these States and institutions: (1)
requiring domestic financial institutions to broadly implement enhanced
reporting requirements; (2) requiring the identification of beneficiaries of
accounts; (3) requiring due diligence for payable-through accounts; (4)
requiring additional information and record keeping on correspondent
accounts; and (5) prohibiting the opening and maintenance of
correspondent accounts for institutions from a named jurisdiction.93 This
tool can be used to persuade States and foreign banks to change the way
they bank, or be prevented from accessing the world's the United States
economy as a consequence.94
91 (1) The "Trading With the Enemy Act" (TWEA), as codified by 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-44; (2)
the "International Emergency and Economic Powers Act" (IEEPA), as codified by 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1702; (3) the "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act" (AEDPA), as
codified by 8 U.S.C. §1189(a); and (4) the "umbrella" delegation by the President of his
powers to the head of any Executive agency under 3 U.S.C. §301. see Crimm, supra note 60,
at 1354-68.
92 Patriot Act, supra note 62, at §311.
93 CFR Report on Terrorist Financing 2002, supra note 17, at 12-13.
94 id
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e. Enforcement and Criticisms
Since September 11, the United States Department of Justice has
aggressively pursued terrorist financiers as a principal component of the
overall "war on terrorism." On February 10, 2002, Enaam Arnaout,
Executive Director of an Islamic charity in Illinois, plead guilty to
funneling money to a terrorist network through the Benevolence
International Foundation (BIF).95 The indictment describes a network that
used charity donations to support al-Qaeda and the mujahideen of
Chechnya and Bosnia.96 Arnaout plead guilty to mail and wire fraud, and
admitted specifically to diverting funds to overseas fighters by transmitting
monetary donations from misled donors to the BIF's bank accounts within
the United States and internationally. 97
Additionally, the U.S. Treasury Department has frozen the bank
accounts of several charities from Texas9 -to Northern Virginia99 and the
Department of Justice has initiated many investigations that have led to
many indictments. Often, alleged terrorist financers are convicted on lesser
charges, such as immigration or naturalization violations.100
According to the U.S. Treasury Department, as of October 11, 2003,
1439 accounts have been frozen worldwide, containing more than $136.7
million in assets ($36.6 million in the U.S. alone); over $60 million in
additional terrorist assets have been seized globally; 315 individuals and
organizations have been declared to be Specially Designated Global
Terrorists under Executive Order 13224.101 The Treasury Department has
95 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, PRESS RELEASE,
Benevolence Director Pleads Guilty to Racketeering Conspiracy and Agrees to Cooperate
with the Government, Feb. 10, 2002, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
usao/iln/pr/2003/pr021003_01.pdf.
96 Indictment, U.S. v. Arnaout, No. 02 CR 892 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
97 Plea Agreement, U.S. v. Amaout, No. 02 CR 892 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
98 Stephen Braun, Charity's Fate Seen as Test of Wider War on Terror, U.S. Accuses an
Islamic Foundation of Ties to HAMAS, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, at 1.
99 Douglas Farah, U.S. Indicts Prominent Muslim Here, Affadavit: Alamoudi Funded
Terrorists, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2003, at Al; Glenn R. Simpson, Unraveling Terror's
Finances: Investigators Say a Key Figure in Network is Indicted, WALL ST. J., Oct., 24,
2003, at A2.
100 Jerry Markon, Man Convicted in Islamic Charity Probe; Prosecutors Say Investment
Firm Founder Had Ties to Terrorists, Urge Longer Sentence, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2003, at
A12; Glenn R. Simpson, U.S. Details an Alleged Terror-Financing Web, Defunct New
Jersey Firm Called Hub of Connection, Suspect to Stay in Custody, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15,
2003, at A5.
101 U.S. DEP'T. OF TREASURY, FACT SHEET, PROGRESS IN THE WAR ON TERRORIST
FINANCING (2003) (hereinafter Treasury Dep't Fact Sheet 2003).
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characterized these seizures as a global disruption of a terrorist financial
network, and has attributed this progress to international cooperation in
designations and seizures. 10 2 Additionally, within the United States the
operations of three major charities and terrorist fundraisers, the Global
Relief Foundation, Benevolence International Foundation, and Holy Land
Foundation for Relief and Development, were designated and stopped.
10 3
However, according to a Treasury Department official speaking on the
condition of anonymity, there were an estimated 500,000 unlicensed and
unregistered MSBs before the Patriot Act went into effect. About 10,000
MSBs have registered since January 1, 2002, however, very few can be
categorized as part of a hawala network.
According to a former Department of Justice official also speaking on
the condition of anonymity, the SARs and CTRs financial institutions are
required to file trigger few investigations. This is due largely to the sheer
amount of SARs that are filed, and the fact that FinCEN lacks the adequate
resources to do real-time scrutiny. 1' 4 Most investigations involving terrorist
financing are prompted by traditional law enforcement techniques,
including the use of confidential informants. Additional investigations are
prompted by the use of intelligence gathered outside the United States by
the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and the
Central Intelligence Agency.
One former bank regulator and State Department official stated that
the problem with America's war on terrorist financing was that it focused
too much on traditional financial institutions. More expertise is needed in
locating and understanding elusive and esoteric ethnic-based informal funds
transfer systems, including hawala and trade-based money laundering,
°0 5
and until such expertise is developed, many of these networks will continue
to slip through the cracks.
102 Id.
103 id.
104 The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the division of the Treasury
Department in charge of examining all CTRs and SARs, received more than twelve million
reports in the year 1997. With dramatically more reports generated because of more
"financial institutions" and the fear of civil and criminal liability, as well as a marginal
increase in FinCEN's staff, it is inevitable that a backlog of reports to review and overall
information glut will be created. See generally Megan Roberts, Big Brother Isn't Just
Watching You, He's Also Wasting Your Tax Payer Dollars: An Analysis of the Anti-Money
Laundering Provisions of the USA Patriot Act, 56 RUTGERS L. REv. 573, at 596-7 (2004).
105 Trade-based money laundering is the "use of trade to legitimize, conceal, transfer, and
convert large quantities of illicit cash into less conspicuous assets or commodities. In turn,
the tangible assets or value are transferred worldwide without being subject to financial
transparency laws and regulations." INCSR 2003, supra note 10, at 21.
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2. Saudi Arabia: The "Epicenter" of Terrorist Fundraising
Saudi Arabia has been described as the "epicenter" of terrorist
financing, primarily because of the existence of a myriad of charity
organizations that have a global presence.
10 6
a. The Regulation of Charity Organizations
Saudi Arabia relies on Shariah law, and the financing of terrorism is
categorized as "spreading evil on earth" (al-ifsadfi al-ard). The Ministry
of Labour and Social Affairs, empowered by the Charitable Institutions and
Associations Ordinance passed by the Council of Ministers Resolution 107
of 1990, is charges with regulating charities.'0 8 Charity organizations must
obtain a permit from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, and only
those licensed charities may collect contributions. 10 9 Furthermore, the
Ordinance grants authority to the Ministry to examine the books, records
and documents of charities, and requires charities to disclose any
information requested by the Ministry."l0
The High Committee on Fundraising has the authority to approve the
transfer of charitable funds collected within Saudi Arabia to foreign
States."' A charity can only disperse funds or operate in those areas of
Saudi Arabia or foreign States that are specified in their charter." 12
Additionally, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs can revoke the
charter and dissolve a charity if it departs from or violates materially its
charter; disposes of its assets in a manner other than specified; or violates
the provisions of the Charitable Institutions and Associations Ordinance." 13
106 Aufhauser, supra note 29.
107 REPORT OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA IN RESPONSE TO THE COMMENTS
CONTAINED IN THE LETTER DATED 18 APRIL 2002 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1373 (2001) CONCERNING
COUNTER-TERRORISM, at 4, subparagraph l(b), U.N. Doc. S/2002/869 (2002) (hereinafter
Saudi Arabia 1373 Report July 2002).
108 REPORT OF SAUDI ARABIA CONTAINING RESPONSES TO THE OBSERVATIONS RECEIVED ON
24 FEBRUARY 2003 IN A LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1373 (2001) CONCERNING COUNTER-TERRORISM, at
9, 1.11, U.N. Doc S/2003/583 (2003) (hereinafter Saudi Arabia 1373 Report May 2003).
109 Id. at 5, subparagraph 1(d).
I0 1d at 9-10, 1.11.
" Saudi Arabia 1373 Report July 2002, supra note 107, at 5, subparagraph 1(d).
12 Id. at 5, subparagraph 1(d).
.13 Saudi Arabia 1373 Report May 2003, supra note 108.
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b. Laws Effective only on Paper
According to the Financial Action Task Force, new Saudi Arabian
laws and regulations meet or exceed international counterterrorist financing
and anti-money laundering standards as written legislation. 14 However,
having effective legislation is only the first part of the process, and
according to a recent Council on Foreign Relations report, Saudi Arabia has
failed to fully implement or enforce its laws, particularly its failure to
enforce such laws on politically protected persons; its failure to take public
punitive actions on those who are "convicted" for terrorist financing; its
failure to make public arrests, trials, or incarcerations; and its failure to
separate Radical Islamic clerics and sympathetic members of the Royal
Family from the now centralized oversight of charities." 5
As mentioned above, the U.S. Treasury Department has reported as of
October 11, 2003 that 1,439 accounts, containing more than $136.7 million
in assets, have been frozen worldwide. 16 However, in Saudi Arabia, Yasin
al-Qadi, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, who heads the Saudi-
based Muwafaq Foundation and "processes" donations from wealthy Saudi
businessmen to al Qaeda, remains free, uncharged and unhindered in his
abuse of the zakat and engaging in terrorist financing.' 17 Additionally,
Wa'el Julaidan, who was jointly designated by both the United States and
Saudi Arabia as a terrorist financier remains free in Saudi Arabia, still
directing charities that provide funding for al-Qaeda. 118
Part of the problem with Saudi Arabia's enforcement has to do with a
lack of a universal definition of terrorism. According to Saudi Arabia,
terrorism under Shariah law is "spreading evil on earth" and is illegal.
However, when the Security Council Committee on Counter-Terrorism
inquired about the procedure of freezing assets, Saudi Arabia responded as
follows:
In the absence of a precise and unequivocal definition of terrorism
endorsed by the international community, in Saudi Arabia measures for
the freezing and seizure of funds can only be taken in accordance with
specific statutory procedures and on the basis of a request from the
Minister of the Interior addressed to the Minister of Finance and National
Economy. 119
114 Robin Allen, Saudis Meet Anti-Terrorist Financing Benchmarks: International
Assessment, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004, at A7.
15 CFR Update on Terrorist Financing 2004, supra note 19, at 17-25.
116 Treasury Dep't Fact Sheet 2003, supra note 101.
17 CFR Update on Terrorist Financing 2004, supra note 19, at 19.
8 id.
"9 Saudi Arabia 1373 Report July 2002, supra note 107, at 5.
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While there might be laws on the books designed to confront terrorist
financing, the disparity is in the enforcement of those laws. According to a
State Department Official, the Saudi Government has been reluctant to
share the names of accounts that have allegedly been frozen. Clearly, well
written laws that criminalize terrorist financing and money laundering are a
step in the right direction, but without enforcement and implementation,
such laws are meaningless. While there has been some cooperation between
the United States and Saudi Arabia regarding the war against terrorism and
terrorist financing, by and large, the motive of the Saudi Government has
been the preservation of the status quo. The political problems in Saudi
Arabia will be discussed further in Part III.
3. The United Arab Emirates: A Conduit for the Movement of
Terrorist Funds
a. Bank Secrecy Laws
According to its report to the U.N., made pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1373, the United Arab Emirates first enacted money laundering
laws in 1987.120 Section 150(c) of the Federal Penal Code of 1987
criminalizes the collection of funds and resources for groups that are hostile
to the United Arab Emirates.121 Section 180.3 criminalizes the acquisition
of funds and resources from sources outside the U.A.E. for the express
purpose of overthrowing the U.A.E. 122
In response to Resolution 1373, the Anti-Money-Laundering Law was
enacted in January of 2002.123 Additionally, the authority that governs
banking policy, the Central Bank, has issued circulars to all banks that
require due diligence in establishing customer identity and reporting
suspicious money transfers, including large deposits of cash, third-party
checks, and the close scrutiny of letters of credit.124
The Minister of Justice has issued rules prohibiting the collection of
contributions by unlicensed charities. 25  The Central Bank has been
120 Law No. 3 of 1987, Federal Penal Code, United Arab Emirates, discussed in REPORT
OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
1373, at 4, 1(a), U.N. Doc. S/2002/239 (2002) (hereinafter U.A.E. 1373 Report March
2002).
121 Id.
122 id.
123 id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 4.
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authorized to consult with the Ministry of Justice to begin the regulation
and licensing of banks to open transparent accounts for approved
charities.
126
The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, which the
U.A.E. ratified in 1999, provides for the blocking and confiscation of assets
and funds related to terrorist crimes. 27 Additionally, the U.A.E. must
comply with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, which requires all
nations to suppress terrorist financing and freeze assets of terrorists. Local
legislation includes Article 182 of the Federal Penal Code, which gives a
court the power to confiscate the property of organizations hostile to the
U.A.E.128  The newer Article 4.2.2 of the Anti-Money-Laundering Law
(Federal Law No. 4 of 2002) grants the Central Bank, the Office of the
Public Prosecutor and a court the authority to order the freezing or
attachment of funds belonging to terrorist organizations suspected of crimes
addressed in the international conventions to which the U.A.E. is a party,
including the Arab Convention and any U.N. Resolutions.1
29
b. The Hawala and Free Trading Zones
Various regulations issued by the Central Bank, including Circular No.
24 of November 2000, mandate the application of the FATF
recommendations on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. 30 In
May 2002, Abu Dhabi hosted an international conference on the hawala
system, which adopted the "Declaration of Abu Dhabi," which encourages
the application of the FATF recommendations to the hawala system and
urge international cooperation in creating norms for hawaladars.' 3 '
However, despite these plans to regulate the hawala, including the
registering and licensing of hawaladars, the U.A.E. admitted in its latest
report to Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1373 that "[p]resently
there is no law governing parallel fund transfer systems.' 32
The September 11th hijackers were wired $110,000 from U.A.E. banks.
At the behest of the United States and Resolution 1373, the U.A.E. has
increased scrutiny of both formal financial institutions and informal funds
126 id.
121Id. at 4, 1(a).
128 Id. at 5.
129 id.
130 REPORT OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES TO THE COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE, at
4, U.N. Doc S/2003/280 (2003) (hereinafter U.A.E. 1373 Report March 2003).
131 Stanley Carvalho, Central Bank Begins Registering Hawala Operators, GULF NEWS
ON-LINE EDITION, Nov. 4, 2002, available at http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/
news.asp?ArticlelD=67552.
132 U.A.E. 1373 Report March 2003, supra note 130, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/2003/280 (2003).
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transfer systems. Banks are now required to report incoming transfers of
more than $11,000, and hawaladars, those few that have voluntarily
registered with the government, are required to report transfers larger than$550. 133
Additionally, free trade zones in the U.A.E. permit complete foreign
ownership and there is little meaningful governmental regulation or
oversight; there is no taxation or import duties and trading licenses are
easily obtainable.' 34 Incoming and outgoing goods are rarely scrutinized.1
35
These regulation-free areas provide ample opportunity to conduct illegal
transactions.
c. Serious Efforts?
The Central Bank has frozen over $3 million in eighteen bank accounts
pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1390.136
Additionally, several individuals have been charged and convicted of
money laundering. 137 However, a State Department official speaking on the
condition of anonymity offered little enthusiasm for these convictions,
commenting that the individuals charged were inconsequential immigrant
workers targeted by the government to demonstrate merely action against
terrorist financing. That same official commented that there exists a
cultural resistance to change regarding record keeping. Off-the-record trade
and transactions is how business has been done for centuries in the Middle
East.
III. Why the Laws are Ineffective: The Cultural, Religious, Political, and
Economic Factors of Terrorist Financing
A. A Brief History of the al-Qaeda Financial Network: The Soviet
Invasion of Afghanistan and the Mujihadeen
The Soviet conflict in Afghanistan provided the need and opportunity
to cultivate a system of finance for the purposes of jihad138 against a
133 Anwar Faruqi, Ambiguous Dubai Money System is Center of Probe, KAN. CITY STAR,
Jan. 18, 2004, at A17.
134 INCSR 2003, supra note 10, at 404.
135 id.
136 id
137 id
138 Jihad means "struggle," and can be interpreted as a personal spiritual struggle or a
theo-political struggle.
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superpower. The relative success of the mujihadeen 139 emboldened actors
like Osama bin Laden, who was a chief architect of the financial network.14
0
Osama bin Laden created the al-Qaeda financial network, utilizing the same
methods that channeled resources to the mujihadeen in their struggle
against the Soviets.' 41  Similar to Irish-Americans donating to the Irish
Republican Army during the 1970's and 1980's, 142 the network utilized a
sense of brotherhood amongst Muslims all over the world, and charity
organizations obtained donations that were funneled through Islamic banks,
routed to Pakistan, where they were used to purchase weapons and other
supplies necessary to fight the Soviets. 43 The US government encouraged
this network, because the target of the jihad was its long time adversary, the
Soviet Union. 1
44
However, old friends became new enemies, and the relative success of
the mujihadeen emboldened actors like Osama bin Laden, who is credited
for the artful application of these fundraising techniques in creating the
current terrorist finance network that now supports radical Islamic
terrorism. 145 Gradually, radical Islamic terrorist organizations have abused
and perverted the principle of charity embodied in the zakat, and it has
become intertwined with terrorist operations and support.
146
Furthermore, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, both Islamic
and radical Islamic institutions, including banks, charities, and schools
filled the void in war-torn areas of Central Asia and the Balkans that had
Muslim populations, yet secular institutions. 147  Saudi Arabia and other
nations provided services that were absent, often coupling much needed
humanitarian relief with an intense radical Islamic propaganda machine.
48
Chechnya, though having a Muslim majority population, was traditionally a
secular nation. 149 The Russian decimation of Chechnya, combined with the
139 Mujihadeen are the warriors of the jihad, often referred to as "Freedom Fighters" by
former President Ronald Reagan. In this context, it refers to actual guerilla attacks against
military targets as well as terrorist attacks against civilians.
140 CFR Report on Terrorist Financing 2002, supra note 17, at 5.
141 id. at 5.
142 NAPOLEONI, supra note 2, at 30-32.
141 Id. at 79-86.
144 "There were 58,000 dead in Vietnam and we owe the Russians one," commented
Texas Democratic Congressman Charles Wilson, quoted in id. at 7.
145 CFR Report on Terrorist Financing 2002, supra note 17, at 5.
146 Terrorist Financing: Origination, Organization, and Prevention: Hearing Before the
Committee on Senate Governmental Affairs, 108 Cong. 80 (2003) (statement of Dr. Dore
Gold, President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs) (hereinafter Gold Testimony).
14 7 NAPOLEONI, supra note 2, at 79-86.
148 id.
149 id.
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introduction of al-Qaeda mujihadeen, has given the conflict in Chechnya a
new radical religious overtone.
5
°
B. Radical Islamic Terrorism: A Clean Money Fundraising
Machine
Osama bin Laden's family's wealth, stemming from an extensive
construction empire, is valued at $300 million, and his personal wealth is
estimated to be around $30 million.'51 He has invested in the manufacture
and trade of honey in Yemen and the Sudan, an ostrich farm and shrimp
business in Kenya, various holding companies, venture capital firms, banks,
and import-export businesses.' 52  Additionally, terrorist operations are
supported by multi-billion dollar businesses run by such financial
institutions as al-Barakaat and al-Taqwa, institutions that run hawalas and
banks.
53
Beyond personal wealth and legitimate business revenue, radical
Islamic terrorist organizations utilize principles of charity found in Islam.
The zakat is the obligatory alms tax or a tax on wealth, which is authorized
in the Koran.' 54 Saudi companies and individuals are subject to the zakat,
'50Id. at 180.
151 GUNARATNA, supra note 5, at 81-82.
152 NAPOLEONI, supra note 2, at 160-163.
153 Press Release, President George W. Bush, Office of the Press Secretary, Terrorist
Financial Network Fact Sheet (Nov. 7, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/1 1/20011107-6.html.
154 Zakat in the Koran:
Al-Baqarah (2), verse 267: "0 you who believe! Spend of the good things which you have (legally)
earned, and of that which We have produced from the earth for you, and do not aim at that which is bad
to spend from it, (though) you would not accept it save if you close your eyes and tolerate therein. And
know that Allah is Rich (Free of all wants), and Worthy of all praise";
Koran, Surah Taubah (9), verse 60: "Zakat is only for the poor, and the needy and those who collect
them, and for to attract the hearts of those who have been inclined (towards Islam); and to free the
captives and those in debt, and for the cause of Allah, and for the wayfarers; a duty imposed by Allah.
And Allah is Knower, Wise";
Koran, Surah Taubah (9), verse 34: "0 ye who believe! there are indeed many among the priests and
anchorites, who in Falsehood devour the substance of men and hinder (them) from the way of Allah.
And there are those who bury gold and silver and spend it not in the way of Allah. Announce unto them
a most grievous penalty,"
quoted in JEAN-CHARLES BRISSARD, TERRORISM FINANCING: ROOTS AND TRENDS OF SAUDI
TERRORIST FINANCING, REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 12 (2002).
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and their contribution is calculated on earnings, profits, capital, and all
other property and monetary acquisitions.
55
Saudi banks pay zakat on financial transaction fees. 156 Since these
contributions are voluntary, there is little governmental oversight in Saudi
Arabia, particularly over individual contributions which often leave no
paper trail.157 Zakat from companies are supposed to be controlled by the
Department of Zakat and Income Taxes of the Saudi Ministry of Finance
and National Economy, which establishes instructions on who pays and
how to pay zakat, and collect the funds and transfer them to charities.
158
Previous attempts to regulate Saudi charities have been ineffective,
including one effort to coordinate charity efforts towards specific goals.
The Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya included
dispersals to the International Islamic Relief Organization, the Muslim
World League, and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth-all
organizations that appear on the State Department's Comprehensive List of
Terrorists and Groups Identified Under Executive Order 13224.159
And zakat is a tremendous source of income, with nearly 6,000
members of the Saudi Royal Family worth over $600 billion, making their
2% zakat contribution alone estimated at $12 billion annually.160  One
estimate suggests that al-Qaeda has received between $300 million and
$500 million in the ten year period of 1992-2002.16 1
During the 1960's and 1970's, large global charities were developed in
Saudi Arabia for the purpose of spreading Wahhabism, 62 and with the rise
of the Mujihadeen during the 1980's, became intertwined with terrorist
operations. 63 While not all Islamic charities are involved in terrorist
operations, some donators have their zakat contribution diverted by
charities that fund legitimate humanitarian operations as well as a militant
arm. Other individuals knowingly contribute to charities that funnel the
funds to terrorists. Some donate to what they believe to be a legitimate
155 Royal Decree No. 17-2-28-2077 of 1380 A.H. (1960), discussed in BRISSARD, supra
note 154, at 20-21.
156 NAPOLEONI, supra note 2, at 123-24.
1571d. at 121.
158 BRISSARD, supra note 154, at 16-17.
159 Id. at 17; U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, Comprehensive List of Terrorists and Groups
Identified Under Executive Order 13224, available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/
rls/fs/2001/653 lpf.htm (2003).
160 NAPOLEONI, supra note 2, at 120
161 BRISSARD, supra note 154, at 3.
162 The official interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia, often regarded as radical or
fundamentalist.
163 Gold Testimony, supra note 146.
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charity and the recipient organization turns out to be a terrorist front for
direct and deceptive fundraising.
Saudi Arabian charities receive between $3 billion to $4 billion
annually, of which between 10% and 20% is sent abroad.' 64 Many
prominent Saudi banking families, including the al-Rajhi and the bin
Mahfouz, have supported charity organizations that have been revealed to
be fundraising fronts for al-Qaeda, including the International Islamic
Relief Organization, the al-Rashid Trust, and the Muslim World League.1
65
The Muslim World League was created in 1962 by the Saudi government,
and is funded by the government as well as other wealthy Saudi families.
166
The Muslim World League is the umbrella under which many other
charities receive support.' Complex fund raising schemes are created, and
the organizations, many sharing the same address, employ what appear to
be multiple fund transfers between organizations, in an attempt to obscure
both the source and destination of the funds.
168
C. Formal Financial Institutions and Informal Funds Transfer
Systems: Difficult to Understand, Detect, and Penetrate.
1. Formal Financial Institutions and Islamic Banking
Islamic banks are another religious instrument allegedly utilized by
terrorist organizations to move funds. 169 Because these institutions operate
under Islamic law, they are not subject to the same types of money
laundering regulations required of secular banks.170 Islamic banks, under
164 BRISSARD, supra note 154, at 26-27.
165 RACHEL EHRENFELD, FUNDING EVIL 35-45 (2003).
166 Id. at 37.
167 Declaration in Support of Pre-Trial Detention, Aff. of Senior Special Agent David
Kane of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States v. Bihieri,
Case No. 03-365-A (E.D. VA 2003): Agent Kane stated that the defendant, who ran an
investment firm accused of materially supporting terrorists, was associated with charities
that according to the CIA had "extremist connections" with Palestinian, Algerian, and
Egyptian terrorist groups. "The IIRO [International Islamic Relief Organization] is affiliated
with the Muslim World League, a major international organization largely financed by the
government of Saudi Arabia." The affidavit further connects the IIRO to Osama bin Laden
and al Qaeda and convicted terrorist Ramzi Yousef.
168 See Amanda Garrett, Terrorists' Money Takes Convoluted Path in U.S.; Web of Links
Leads Investigators to Imam, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 18, 2004, at Al.
169 See Marc Hambach, Islamic Financing: Facts to Replace the Fear, 16 MoNEY
LAUNDERING ALERT 11 (Feb. 2005) (suggesting that Islamic banks are regulated no
differently then secular banks, and arguing that Islamic law does not conflict with the
international anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing laws and practice).
170 CFR Report on Terrorist Financing 2002, supra note 17, at 9-10.
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Islamic law are prohibited from participating in transactions involving un-
Islamic activities, such as gambling or alcohol, as well as criminal
activities. 171 However, just as Saudi Arabia and other States do not consider
providing material support to some terrorist organizations to be "terrorist
financing," it is easy to suspect how some Islamic banks could take
advantage of the lack of a universal definition of terrorism and also be
complicit in the role they may play in the problem.
These banks may voluntarily choose to comply with regulations, but
there exists no control mechanism to monitor compliance. 172 Many Islamic
charities use these banks, which makes them ideal for clever terrorists to
hide and transfer funds. Islamic banks operate throughout the Middle East,
Africa and Asia, and have even opened up investment houses in Europe.
The goal of Islamic banking is to serve and promote Islam and some of
these banks are suspected of being sympathetic and complicit in channeling
funds marked for terrorist organizations. 173
Osama bin Laden paid $50 million to gain control of the al-Shamil
Islamic Bank in Sudan,' 1 and used the banks to channel funds to his agent
sleeper cells.' 75 Testimony given during a 2001 criminal trial dealing with
the 1998 embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi reveals bin
Laden's involvement: 1 76
Q. Did you work on the finances for al Qaeda while you were in the
Sudan?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you know where the bank accounts of Osama bin Laden and al
Qaeda were?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know whose names they were in?
A. The bank account under Osama bin Laden in Bank Shaml [al Shamal
Islamic Bank], Khartoum.
Q. That was under Osama bin Laden's true name?
A. Yes.
Q. Were there accounts in other names?
171 Hambach, supra note 169.
172 BRISSARD, supra note 154, at 20-21.
173 NAPOLEONI, supra note 2, at 112.
174 Borzou Daraghi, Financing Terror, TME, Nov. 2001.
175 Jonathan Wells et al., War on Terrorism: Saudi Elite Tied to Money Groups Linked to
bin Laden, B. HERALD, Oct. 14, 2001.
176 Trial Testimony of Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, US v. Usama bin Laden, S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, at
319-21 (S.D. NY 2001).
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A. Yes. Afad Makkee got account also.
Q. Afad Makkee, the account that he had under his name, do you know
what name that is?
A. I remember Madani Sidi al Tayyib.
Q. Do you know of any other persons who had al Qaeda money in their
accounts?
A. Abu Rida al Suri.
Q. Do you know his true name?
A. Nidal.
Q. Anyone else that you knew had al Qaeda money in bank accounts in
their name?
A. Abu Hajer al Iraqi.
Q. Do you know his true name?
A. Mamdouh Salim.
Q. Did you have any accounts in your name?
A. Shared with Abu Fadhl.
Q. So you had accounts in your name that were shared with Abu Fadhl?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall anyone else that had bank accounts in their name for al
Qaeda?
A. Abdouh al Mukhlafi.
Islamic banks have been described as the "lifeline of Islamist
insurgency." 177 A 1999 audit by the Saudi government found that the
National Commercial Bank had transferred $3 million to charity 178
organizations that served as fronts for Osama bin Laden's network.
1 79
2. Informal Funds Transfer Systems: The Hawala
The U.A.E. at one time had vast oil reserves, but with the oil supply
now receding, the U.A.E. has refashioned itself as the major financial
center of the Middle East. The lax regulation of banking and commerce has
provided Dubai with tremendous wealth and growth, and it is often
compared to the laissez-faire Hong Kong of the 1970's. This dependence
177 NAPOLEONI, supra note 2, at 121.
178 Jack Kelly, Saudi Money Aiding bin Laden: Businessmen are Financing Front
Groups, USA TODAY, Oct. 29, 1999 at IA.
179 EHRENFELD, supra note 165, at 47.
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on being a financial center, combined with its many "free trade zones"
makes unrealistic any hopes of strengthening regulation.
The U.A.E. has long had a history of opaque transactions, which mix
legal and illegal free trade and funds. 80 Western-based arms dealers and
South American drug cartels have long taken advantage of the anonymity
the country's lax banking regulations permit. 181 The Emirates also have
"free trade zones" which allow foreigners unfettered access and control
over commercial activities that include legitimate items like Sony
televisions to illegal gemstones. 82 Another factor that makes Dubai a
conduit of terrorist financing are the presence of over eighty known hawala
operators. 1
83
A hawala is an informal funds transfer system, and it is mostly used by
Asian and Middle Eastern migrants to send money back to their home
country. 84  However, the networks provide a possible primary delivery
system for terrorists, who allegedly take advantage of the lack of formal
record keeping, enabling the clandestine transfer of funds.
Hawala transaction methods vary in sophistication. One journalist's
description demonstrates the subtlety often employed by hawaladars:
Hawala consists of transferring money (usually across borders in order to
avoid taxes or the need to bribe officials) without physical or electronic
transfer of funds. Money changers (hawaladar) receive cash in one
country, no questions asked. Correspondent hawaladars in another
country dispense an identical amount (minus minimal fees and
commissions) to a recipient or, less often, to a bank account.
Hundi (short term, discountable, negotiable promissory note) couriers
carrying an e-mail or letter convey the necessary information (the amount
of money, the date it has to be paid on) between hawaladars. The sender
provides the recipient with code words (or numbers, for instance the serial
numbers of currency notes), a digital encrypted message or agreed signals
180 INCSR 2002, supra note 18, at 297-99.
181 Glenn R. Simpson, UA.E. Banks Had Suspect Transfers, WALL ST. J., Sep. 17, 2003,
at A10.
182 Timothy L. O'Brien, Terror Fund Focus is on Dubai: Ancient Ways Make Money
Hard to Track, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 6, 2003, at 1.
183 ld.
184 Sam Vaknin, Analysis: Hawala, the Bank That Never Was, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Oct.
17, 2001, available at http://www.upi.com/print.cfm? StorylD=16102001-025648-5774r;
see Hawala and Underground Terrorist Financing Mechanism, supra note 26 (describing a
licensed hawaladar operating within the United States).
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like handshakes to use to retrieve the money. Big hawaladars use a chain
of middlemen in cities around the globe.1
85
The system is difficult to penetrate and understand due to the lack of
paperwork needed to complete a transaction, and the ancient and ethnic
character of this network based on trust.1 86  In India, despite being
outlawed, some 50% of the economy uses the hawala network. 187 In the
money laundering hub that is Dubai, the hawalas have only recently been
asked to register with the government. 88 Still, the governor of the U.A.E.
Central Bank, Sultan bin Nasser al Suwaidi, admitted that the hawaladars
are left to police themselves, and expressed a reluctance to disrupt the
ancient practice. 8 9
D. Mixing Religion with Politics: Wahhabism and the House of
Saud
1. Wahhabism
Osama bin Laden and fifteen out of nineteen of the September 1 th
hijackers were Saudi nationals. In Saudi Arabia, the official interpretation
of Islam is Wahhabism, a puritanical conception of the faith that is
particularly adept at converting disillusioned men into terrorists. 90 What is
particularly alarming about Wahhabism is the intolerance for other religions
and interpretations of Islam, including a hatred for Shi'ites and non-devout
Sunnis.' 9 Awareness of Wahhabism is central to understanding terrorist
financing because it provides the ideological framework that targets non-
followers for terrorist attacks. Fundraising occurs by combining this radical
interpretation with more universal characteristics of Islam, such as the zakat
(mandatory charity donation).
185 Id.
186 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, REPORT ON MONEY
LAUNDERING TYPOLOGIES: 1999-2000 (2001).
187 id.
188 Timothy L. O'Brien, Terror Fund Focus is on Dubai: Ancient Ways Make Money
Hard to Track, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 6, 2003, at 1.
189 id.
190 NAPOLEONI, supra note 2, at 118-19, 128-29.
191 Michael Scott Doran, The Saudi Paradox, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 35, 46-49 (2004)
(describing the "U.S.-Shi'ite conspiracy").
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Wahhabism began in the Arabian Peninsula around 1740.192 Sheikh
Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab added a sixth pillar to the known Five
Pillars193 of Islam: jihad for the purpose of spreading Islam.194 By the
1930's, The House of Saud had managed to unify the Arabian Peninsula,
due in large part to its alliance with Wahhabist clerics. Under this
arrangement, the King of Saudi Arabia is charged with the duty of
spreading Wahhabism throughout the world. 195
As a key component of Saudi foreign policy, the proselytizing nature
of Wahhabism caused the Saudi government to recognize the Taliban
regime. 196 Another aspect of the Saudi influence is the proliferation of
madrasas, religious schools that teach primarily Wahhabism over other
areas like mathematics or chemistry. 97 Saudi Arabian charities actually
give scholarships to foreign students in disillusioned places like Bosnia to
study fundamentalism at a madrassa1
98
2. The House of Saud
When the House of Saud' 99 unified the Arabian Peninsula, it struck a
partnership with influential clerics of the Wahhabi faith.200 Understanding
this relationship is essential to understanding why the United States'
supposed allies in the war on terrorism have been at best halfhearted or at
worst uncooperative in their efforts.
Within domestic Saudi politics, there are two principles opposed to
each other over the question of whether or not the state should be more
secularized. 20' The first is the Taqarub, which promotes peaceful
coexistence with non-Wahhabists as well as democratic reform. 20 2 In direct
opposition to Taqarab is Tawhid, which means "monotheism" and brands
192 David E. Kaplan, The Saudi Connection, U.S. NEWS & WORLD R., Dec. 15, 2003, at
20.
193 EHRENFELD, supra note 165, at 25.
194 1d.
195 NAPOLEONI, supra note 2, at 129.
196 id.
197 id.
198 id.
199 The Saudi royal family that runs Saudi Arabia as a division of fiefdoms. There are
estimated to be about 4,000 members of the royal family, with four or five princes regarded
as the most powerful and influential. Doran, supra note 191, at 35-36.
200 Kaplan, supra note 192.
201 Doran, supra note 191, at 36.
202 Id. at 38-42.
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non-Wahhabists as polytheists or idolators.2 °3 The Wahhabist clerics
follow Tawhid, while many of the Saudi elite follow Taqarab.2°  Crown
Prince Abdullah aligns himself with Taqarab, while his half-brother Prince
Nayef, the interior minister and head of the secret police, has chosen
Tawhid.2 °5
This dominance of Wahhabism in Saudi politics and society causes the
commercial relationship (selling of oil) with the west and the stationing of
U.S. troops on Saudi soil to be under constant scrutiny.0 6 The most radical
clerics want the creation of a pure Wahhabist state, and they want the end
of economic exploitation by the non-Wahhabists, or "infidels. 20 7
The radical clerics of Wahhabism have similar ideologies to al-Qaeda,
but they differ as to their attitude towards the Saudi royal family. 20 8 The
clerics need sympathetic royal family members like Nayef to ensure their
dominance in Saudi society by preventing reform that would undermine
their power.20 9 The royal family needs the clerics because the clerics grant
religious legitimacy to the throne.210
Osama bin Laden and other terrorist organizations with similar
agendas have a dislike for the West, 211 and as seen in recent al-Qaeda
attacks in Riyadh, they also hate regimes that they view as illegitimate,
including those in the royal family that are reform minded. To institute
global and local jihad, it is believed that the "far enemy", the U.S., was
attacked, to cause a domestic crisis against the "near enemy," the Saudi
royal family. 2
12
The Saudi government's interest to crack down on terrorist financing
appears obvious, but such a crack down would cause social upheaval and
even further radicalize the Middle East. So the government of Saudi Arabia
finds itself in a very tight spot, with lucrative oil revenues and self-survival
at risk. In fact, it has been alleged that some of Osama bin Laden's key
203 Id. at 36-38.
2 4Id. at 37.
20 5 Id. at 37, 38.
206 NAPOLEONI, supra note 2, at 25, 175.
21d. at 25, 175.
208 Doran, supra note 191, at 37, 43-44.
209 Id. at 47-48.
2 10 Id. at 37.
211 See SECOND REPORT OF THE MONITORING GROUP ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1363 (2001) AND EXTENDED BY RESOLUTION 1390 (2002), at 15, U.N.
Doc. S/2002/1050 (2002) ("[t]he bottom line is that members of al-Qa'idah, deployed in
many countries across the world, will, given the opportunity, have no compunction in killing
as many of those who do not conform to their 'religious/ideological' beliefs").
212 Doran, supra note 191, at 42-43.
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financial contributors are independent wealthy businessmen.2 3  They
donate not necessarily out of sympathy for the cause of Wahhabism, but to
prevent their businesses from being the target of terrorist attacks.214 This
political reality causes the Saudi Arabian government to take a near
schizophrenic position: to appear to be confronting terrorism by writing
laws, but to not enforce those laws in order to appease the radical clerics
and al-Qaeda.
In reality, some $12 billion dollars from the Saudi royal family alone,
is collected annually for zakat.21 5 The terrorist Ramzi Yousef had funds
transferred to him, money that was a charitable donation from a Holy Water
import company.21 6 At least 50% of HAMAS' operating budget of $10
million dollars a year allegedly comes from Saudi Arabia.2  Saudi officials
allegedly channel between $80 to $100 million a year to the Palestinian
Authority.218 Individual Saudi donors have not been prohibited from
donating to HAMAS. Although the U.S. has tried to persuade nations and
organizations to designate HAMAS and Hezbollah as a terrorist
organization, Saudi Arabia distinguishes between the military and political
arm of the group.
3. The Economic Relationship between Saudi Arabia and the
United States
The relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia is
important because it affects energy security (oil), Iraq, the Middle East
peace process, and the war on terrorism.2 '9 Ever since the first oil embargo
by OPEC in the early 1970's, an arrangement was made between the United
States and Saudi Arabia, where Saudi Arabia, as the largest oil producer on
the oil market, would control the market price of crude oil, and sell barrels
2 13 NAPOLEONI, supra note 2, at 121-22.
214 1d; but see Robin Allen & Roula Khalaf, Al Qaeda: Terrorism after Afghanistan, FIN.
TIMEs, Feb. 21, 2002, at 10 (quoting one sympathetic Saudi businessman: "Who did not pay
for Kashmir and Chechnya? Muslims were being hurt there and people didn't ask where the
money was going... It's about defending our brethren.").
215 NAPOLEONI, supra note 2, at 120.
216 Mark Huband, Inside al-Qaeda, Bankrolling bin Laden, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at
10.
217 Don Van Nattta Jr. & Timothy L. O'Brien, Saudi Aid to HAM4S Raises Eyebrows,
N.Y. Times News Service, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Sept. 18, 2003, at A7.
218 Josh Meyer, The Terrorism Money Trail is Filled with Roadblocks; The Financial and
Legal Infrastructures Needed to Freeze Terrorist Assets are Years A way for some Countries,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 5, 2003, at GI.
219 CFR Update on Terrorist Financing 2004, supra note 19, at 27.
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to the United States at a discount rate. 220 Additionally, Saudi Arabia was
convinced to use its oil revenues and invest heavily within the United
States, routinely purchasing such expensive items as weapons and
commercial jets, as well as investing heavily in commercial enterprises
such as Citibank.221 Because of the heavy presence of Saudi investment
inside America, and America's reliance on Saudi market price controls on
crude oil, the economic consequences of a true breakdown in Saudi and
American relations are unimaginably catastrophic to the United States.
Perhaps that is why American policy has been as favorable as possible to
Saudi Arabia,222  despite American criticism of Saudi Arabian
counterterrorism efforts as "seriously flawed. 223
IV. Conclusion
The laws designed to suppress terrorist financing are ineffective for a
variety of reasons. It is not enough to have well written laws on the books
that criminalize such activity. Enforcement of laws is needed to really
make a difference, and such enforcement must be fair, seeking to minimize
collateral consequences to those actors who are engaged in non-criminal
charity activity or informal funds transfer. The United States, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates all have laws on the books that, if enforced
would be key contributions in stopping terrorism. However, the problem of
suppressing terrorist financing is not necessarily one of laws or law
enforcement. Rather, the suppression of terrorist financing is made difficult
for the non-legal reasons summarized below.
A. Sensitivity and Restraint
Radical Islamic terrorist organizations abuse various Islamic
principles, such as the zakat, in order to further their purposes. Such an
intertwining of terrorism with legitimate religious principles of charity and
peace necessitates that any counterterrorist financing regime be sensitive to
peaceful followers of Islam not materially supportive of terrorism or
220 See generally, ROBERT BAER, SLEEPING WITH THE DEvIL: How WASHINGTON D.C. SOLD
OUR SOUL FOR SAUDI CRUDE (2004); Robert Baer, The Fall of the House of Saud, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY (May, 2003).
221 Id.
222 id.
223 CFR Update on Terrorist Financing 2004, supra note 19, at 2-3. "In public, White
House and State Department spokespersons continued to refuse to criticize the job Saudi
Arabia was doing to combat terrorist financing; indeed, the same week of public reports
concerning the possible imposition by the president of unilateral sanctions, the White House
spokesperson maintained that Saudi Arabia was a good partner in the war on terrorism."
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terrorist organizations. It is important to avoid the appearance of a uniform
restriction on all Islamic charity organizations. However, as a group, all
Islamic charities within the United States have seen a decline in donations,
and it appears that such activity has been chilled, because of concern about
the criminal and civil liability exposure that following the Second Pillar of
Islam, the zakat, could trigger.224
B. It Takes Time and Effort to Develop a Financial Intelligence
Network
On one level the laws are not sufficiently enforced because many
States lack the sufficient law enforcement infrastructure to do sophisticated
financial investigations. Because funds can be transferred via many
different and circuitous routes, uniform international enforcement of
Security Council Resolution 1373 is necessary to stop the flow of fumds. In
the U.S., the best that can be hoped for is the prevention of domestic
financial institutions being used as a conduit for terrorist financing.
Furthermore, high profile material support prosecutions in the United States
may eventually have a deterrent effect on individuals and terrorist front
charity organizations. Still, all financial institutions, not just those in the
Middle East, have little economic interest in cutting off all illegal funds: the
influx of banking proceeds brings in revenue. Rather, financial institutions
may do just enough to appease regulators, and regulators may not ask too
much of financial institutions because they do not want to destroy the
financial sector.
Money laundering as it relates to drugs is a crime in the United Arab
Emirates. 5 However, banks in the U.A.E. value secrecy, and there appears
to be little urgency to regulate all money laundering and terrorist financing
because its cities are largely devoid of the street crime that made narcotics
such a pressing concern in America.2 26 Being as it is not in the economic
interest of those that operate in free trade zones, and being as there is little
street crime or drug dealing in Dubai, it is quite possible that the authorities
"just don't get it." A financial intelligence infrastructure takes time to
develop, and with further technological developments and investigational
experience, improved detection of crimes and enforcement of laws may
224 Crimm, supra note 60, at 1349-51.
225 INCSR 2002, supra note 18, at 298-99.
226 "Dubai is about the size of Las Vegas, but a woman can safely walk alone at night
pretty much anywhere," in J. Orlin Grabbe, In Praise of Hawala, THE LAISSEZ FAIRE
ELECTRONIC TIMEs (May 13, 2002), at http://freedom.orlingrabbe.com/lfetimes/hawala.htm;
"We don't have the causes of money laundering: we don't have drugs, and corruption and
crimes are very limited," U.A.E. Central Bank Governor Sultan bin Nassar al Suwaidi, in
Timothy L. O'Brien, Terror Fund Focus is on Dubai: Ancient Ways Make Money Hard to
Track, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 6, 2003, at 1.
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become an eventuality, so long as there are no other impediments to
suppressing terrorist financing. Unfortunately, there are major obstacles
that hinder law enforcement that are unlikely to be removed without
catastrophic consequences.
C. The Political Obstacles
The problem is political in nature. The Royal family of Saudi Arabia
is engaged in a struggle for its existence, and to expect that regime to crack
down on very popular activities is unrealistic. As discussed at the end of
Part III, the many different domestic political factions within Saudi Arabia,
sans al-Qaeda, are self-interested in preserving the status quo, because only
the status quo allows the co-existence of reformers and Wahhabists. This
complicated situation, combined with an American interest in preserving a
beneficial commercial relationship with Saudi Arabia, is a recipe for inertia
in the war against terrorism.
D. The Economic Problem
The problem of terrorist financing is economic in nature. States like
the Cayman Islands and the United Arab Emirates pride themselves on the
financial secrecy their laws and banking practices permit. Such jurisdictions
see a large increase in gross domestic product by virtue of the large amount
of business their culture of financial secrecy attracts. Additionally, many
Middle Eastern States have never regulated private business; rather,
informal and secretive transactions are how business is conducted. It might
take a long time before this laissez-faire culture may be modified to stop
international problems such as narcotics trafficking or terrorism.
E. The Political and Economic Problem Combined
The problem of terrorist financing is sometimes both economic and
political. A state with reasonably written and enforced counterterrorist
financing laws, such as the United States, often is prohibited from enforcing
the laws against such actors like Saudi Arabia. Under §311 of the Patriot
Act, the President has the authority to ban whole States and foreign
financial institutions that are suspected of terrorist financing, also known as
"special measures." This tool can be used to persuade States and foreign
financial institutions to change the way they bank, or suffer the
consequences of no access to the world's most stable economies. 227 Special
measures have been threatened against the States of Nauru, Ukraine, and
Burma, States that are known to be money laundering havens, but not
227 CFR Report on Terrorist Financing 2002, supra note 17, at 12-13.
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necessarily terrorist financing jurisdictions.228 However, special measures
have actually been imposed on two Syrian institutions in Syria and its
subsidiary in Lebanon, two terrorist financing jurisdictions. 229 But, with the
bulk of terrorist funds being raised in Saudi Arabia, and both nations
dependent on each other for economic and security reasons, it is doubtful
that the United States would ever impose special measures on the
"epicenter of terrorist financing."
228 CFR Update on Terrorist Financing 2004, supra note 19, at 25.
229 Press Release, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, Treasury Designates Commercial Bank of
Syria as Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern, (May 11, 2004)
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/jsl538.htm.
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